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Introduction
In the period from 1960 to 2005 world trade has grown amazingly faster than world GDP. Recently, this view has been challenged. Rose (2004, p. 110) estimates the in ‡uence of WTO on international trade in a gravity type approach and …nds that "membership in the WTO seems not to have an economically or statistically signi…cant e¤ect on trade [...]".
His results indicate that the trade patterns of WTO members are not signi…cantly different from those of non-members. Instead, other institutional variables a¤ect aggregated bilateral trade ‡ows signi…cantly, e. g. membership in a preferential trading area or in a currency union. In addition, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) seems to have a positive impact on bilateral trade. Under GSP schemes countries can grant reduced or zero tari¤ rates for selected products originating from developing countries. The least developed countries further receive special and preferential treatment for a wider coverage of products. The purpose of this program that has been established in the 1970s was to promote economic growth and development by stimulating least developed countries' exports. 1 In the meantime Rose's conclusions have been challenged in a number of papers. Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2005) criticize the use of an OLS estimator, as it is a standard result in the econometric literature that the existence of individual speci…c e¤ects causes OLS estimation to be biased and inconsistent. Instead, speci…c panel estimators such as …xed e¤ects (FE) or random e¤ects (RE) should be used.
2 They also point out that 1 See http://www.unctad.org. 2 E. g. see Baltagi, ed (2001) or Greene, ed (2002 In comparison, the Generalized System of Preferences is less e¤ective and increases trade by 21%. Tomz et al. (2005) do not address another evident shortcoming of Rose's (2004) analysis, namely the use of aggregated bilateral trade data. Contrary to Tomz et al. (2005) and Subramanian and Wei (2003) , our analysis indicates that the Generalized System of Preferences is negatively associated with the imports of the preference granting countries. This might be due to the political economy of GSP schemes which are typically granted for products that are relatively unimportant for GSP granting countries. As soon as these products become economically important, GSP schemes are often limited by quotas, product exclusions and other restrictive measures.
While previous work has focused on product level, we …nd evidence for this e¤ect on the macro level. Comparing our analysis with previous studies we …nd that this result hinges on including very small countries in the data set. Hence, we conclude that the …nding of a positive WTO e¤ect is a robust result that also holds for other multilateral institutions like regional trade agreements and currency unions. In contrast, the impact of the GSP is likely to be negative.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of our approach, in particular the gravity equation and the estimation method. Section 3 presents our empirical results and relates them to the literature. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
Following Rose (2004) In a …rst step we discuss the broad version of the gravity equation as used in Rose (2004) to provide an overview and a better understanding of the research strategy.
log bilateral trade = + 1 both partners inside the WTO + 2 one inside + 3 GSP+ 1 log real GDP + 2 log real GDP per capita + 3 regional trade agreement + 4 currency union + 5 currently colonized + 6 log distance + 7 common language + 8 common border + 9 common colonizer + 10 ever colony + 11 common country + 12 landlocked + 13 island
where i and j denote trading partners and t denotes time. GSP accounts for membership in the Generalized System of Preferences and is de…ned by 1 if the importing country grants the GSP scheme to the exporting country, 0 otherwise. Concerning this parameter, there also exist at least two hypotheses.
With respect to the original purpose of the GSP, the coe¢ cient should be positive if the GSP raises the imports of the GSP granting country. In contrast, this coe¢ cient should be negative if we …nd GSP granting countries to behave opportunistically, i.
e. they grant GSP schemes as long as the selected products are not important for their imports, but as soon as they get relevant, the industrialized countries impose quotas, product exclusions and other restrictive measures.
The remaining variables control for geographic, economic and cultural similarities and dissimilarities of the trading partners which could foster or impede bilateral trade. All of these standard variables are described in the appendix. Obviously, when applying FE estimation the time-invariant variables drop out of the analysis.
Following Tomz et al. (2005) Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) or Bergstrand (1985) . 11 Following Subramanian and Wei (2003) we split up the regressand, aggregate bilateral trade, into exports and imports, i. e. the data set accounts for the imports from country i to j and for the imports from country j to i.
12 The export ‡ows of the developing countries in a GSP relationship are identical to the imports of the Our sample covers 145 countries during the period 1962 to 1999 with annual data. The export/import data are from Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma and Mo (2004) while the other variables originate from Rose (2004) . To account for de facto WTO membership we modi…ed the Rose data according to Tomz et al. (2005) .
As proposed by Greene (2002) and Baltagi (2001) we use panel estimators to account for individual speci…c e¤ects to avoid biased estimation results. While Cheng and Wall (2005) and Wall (1999) propose FE and RE models for the estimation of gravity models we follow Tomz et al. (2005) using a FE estimator for our regressions which is also suggested by our post estimation tests.
3 Estimation results
In the following we present our empirical results (indicated as HW) and relate them to the estimations of Rose (2004) we investigate the gap between TGR and SW. As the di¤erences between these two studies are more complex, we pursue this issue from two sides. Our regression (HW) di¤ers from TGR insofar as we use disaggregated bilateral trade data. This feature shortens the observation period from 1949-99 to 1962-99 and reduces the country sample from 178 to GSP granting countries. We use the imports of the latter so that we are consistent with the de…nition of only the importing country participating in the GATT/WTO. 13 The correlation coe¢ cient of corr(u i , Xb) = -0.2796 indicates endogenity between the independent variables and the individual-speci…c error terms with which a FE estimator can cope, instead of the RE estimator. The Hausman test gives information about the consistency and e¢ ciency of the estimators. The FE is consistent under the null-hypothesis and the alternative whereas the RE is consistent and e¢ cient under the null-hypothesis but inconsistent under the alternative. The null-hypothesis can be rejected with chi 2 (45) = 1437.70 which means that the FE estimator is to be favored due to its consistency. 14 We are able to dublicate the results of Rose with our replication exactly. We are also able to reconstruct the estimates of Tomz et al. (2005) 1 ). Currency unions enhance trade as do regional free trade areas and current colonial relationships. A comparison across all …ve regressions reveals that the parameter values di¤er somewhat, but the substantially positive impact on bilateral trade is common to all estimations. The common real GDP per capita has a negative sign in our regressions. Bergstrand (1989) shows that the expectation of a positive sign strongly depends on the assumptions made on the traded goods and that the expected coe¢ cient sign would change as soon as at least one of these assumptions fails. Next, we will discuss the main di¤erences between the various regressions. SW use a di¤erent data set as they account for the direction of the bilateral trade ‡ows.
They …nd that GSP promotes trade by 49%, a larger e¤ect than found by RO-FE or TGR.
Concerning the e¤ect of WTO membership, they di¤erentiate between industrialized and developing countries. The left hand side of column SW (table 1) Concerning GSP, our empirical results di¤er distinctly from previous studies. We …nd a signi…cantly negative e¤ect of the Generalized System of Preferences of around -16%
on bilateral trade while all other regressions report a substantially positive impact. In-stead of enhancing trade, the GSP seems to inhibit bilateral trade. This might be due to the political economy of GSP schemes which are typically granted for products that are relatively unimportant for GSP granting countries. As soon as these products become economically important, GSP schemes are often limited by quotas, product exclusions and other restrictive measures. 16 While previous work has focused on product level, we …nd evidence for this e¤ect on the macro level. Is the di¤erence in the GSP e¤ect due to the shorter observation period or the smaller country sample? As a next step we look into possible causes for the di¤erence in the estimated GSP e¤ect. As a starting point we take the regression of TGR which is based on the data set of Rose (2004) . Our data set which is based on Feenstra et al. (2004) di¤ers from the Rose (2004) data in that it di¤erentiates between exports and imports, while Rose's data cover aggregate trade only. This comes at a price as our data set is shorter (1949 -1999 versus 1962 -1999) and as it lacks a number of very small countries with less than one million inhabitants (178 countries versus 145 countries). 17 Hence, we re-estimate TGR with a shorter time period, namely from 1962-99, and afterwards we additionally account for the smaller country sample (SCS) (table 2).
In TGR ( In TGR (SCS) we additionally account for the e¤ect of the smaller country sample, again using data from 1962-1999. 18 The e¤ects of WTO membership are similar, but the impact of the GSP turns signi…cantly negative although the coe¢ cient is relatively small (-0.03).
Thus, the positive e¤ect of GSP on trade found by several authors is not robust and seems to be due to the speci…c role of small countries of less than one million inhabitants.
We therefore conclude that GSP typically seems to have a negative e¤ect on trade, with the exception of very small countries and territories. In contrast, shortening the data set by leaving out the 1950s does not change the empirical results.
Does the GSP e¤ect depend on the level of development? Table 3 takes a look at trade between countries with di¤erent development levels. Following the de…nition of
Rose (2004) we di¤erentiate three groups of countries, low income, middle income and high income countries. Concerning WTO membership of both trading countries, our estimation indicates that WTO membership is generally favorable as seven out of nine coe¢ cients are signi…cantly positive and none of the remaining is signi…cantly negative. Collective WTO membership increases imports of high income countries from middle income countries signi…cantly by 11%, whereas imports of middle income countries from high income countries are not a¤ected by WTO accession.
By contrast, imports of high income countries from low income countries do not change signi…cantly, whereas imports of low income countries from high income countries increase by 20%. Generally, WTO membership of both partners enhances trade for countries of all income levels, but trade ‡ows between high income countries and middle as well as low income countries are a¤ected unequally. Concerning GSP, the average e¤ect on imports is signi…cantly negative in contrast to the …ndings of previous studies. Distinguishing di¤erent income levels reveals that this e¤ect is relatively small if high income countries grant GSP to middle income countries and is even not signi…cant if high income importers grant GSP to low income countries.
While in contrast with RO, TGR and SW our …ndings are in line with the hypothesis of opportunistic behavior of industrialized countries, Langhammer and Sapir (1987) point out that the two components of GSP, the reduction of tari¤s and the preferential treatment for suppliers, produce opposing e¤ects, namely trade creation and trade diversion. In review of the empirical literature they report con ‡icting results as some studies found GSP net trade creation e¤ects whereas others identi…ed net trade diversion e¤ects. Manchin Second, several GSP schemes are likely to be restricted to sectors, in which developing countries lack comparative advantage. Third, trade expansion e¤ects by GSP schemes are often limited by quotas, product exclusions and other restrictive measures. In their survey of the empirical literature concerning the GSP e¤ects, Hoekman and Özden (2005, p. 40) conclude that the GSP is likely not to contribute to the promotion of international trade of developing countries.
In contrast, the negative impact is relatively strong for medium income importers granting GSP to other middle income exporters or to low income exporters. It should be noted that the only middle income countries that o¤er GSP schemes are Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland which during the 1980s faced severe socioeconomic problems a¤ecting their imports negatively. Since these countries grant GSP schemes since the middle of the 1970s, this e¤ect might be picked up by the GSP dummy although there need not to be a casual link. But still, the other GSP coe¢ cients are either small or not signi…cant, but never substantially positive.
Taken together, we conclude that GSP has negative or insigni…cant e¤ects on trade. The average negative impact of GSP on bilateral trade in our regression is driven by its impact on the sub-samples of the trade relations of middle income importers and middle income exporters as well as low income exporters. 20 Only in the special case of very small countries does GSP seem to have a positive e¤ect.
Conclusion
In this paper we generalize the di¤erent approaches used in the literature to estimate the role of GATT/WTO and the Generalized System of Preferences for trade. Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences previous work found trade enhancing e¤ects. In our sample we …nd that the GSP does not foster trade in general, rather the opposite. This might be due to the political economy of GSP schemes which are typically granted for products that are relatively unimportant for GSP granting countries. In case these imported products gain relevance, GSP schemes are often limited by quotas, product exclusions and other restrictive measures. Generally, one can observe this mechanism only on the product level, but we …nd evidence for this e¤ect in a macroeconomic model.
Comparing our analysis with previous studies we …nd that this result hinges on including very small countries in the data set. Hence, we conclude that the …nding of a positive WTO e¤ect is a robust result that also holds for other multilateral institutions like regional trade agreements and currency unions. In contrast, the impact of the GSP is likely to be negative. 20 If we regress on bilateral imports without accounting for GSP schemes granted by Hungary, Poland and Romania, the average GSP coe¢ cient is indeed around -0.09. 
APPENDIX APPENDIX A: Data adjustments
To be able to combine the data sets of Rose and Feenstra, these are adjusted in the following way:
Country correction First, countries are adjusted, because both data sets contain partly di¤erent countries. In a …rst step, states have been eliminated that were not congruent in both data sets. Next, we have accounted for countries that experienced a reuni…cation or a splitting during the period of interest. This reduced the number of nations to 145. A list of the adjusted nations can be seen in table below.
Correction of trade relations
Despite the great number of coinciding trade relations, there are some di¤erences. According to the country correction only these trading partners remain in the data set that exist simultaneously in both data sets. This adjustment leads to 16.924 trade relations.
Adjustment of the longitudinal axis
The time axis has to be adjusted in order to sort out last gaps in the data set. Rose's data set reach from 1949 through 1999, while Feenstra's covers the period from 1962 through 2000. Thus, only the core interval of 1962 through 1999 is kept.
We drop trading pairs that have less than two observations which means 4,394 ( 1.59%) observations are lost. 21 Thus, the data set reduces to 271,169 observations.
APPENDIX B: The variables
log Distance describes the log of the great circle distance of two trading countries.
This geographic parameter implies the greater the distance the smaller the bilateral trade volume due to transportation costs; the coe¢ cient is expected to be negative.
log real GDP and log real GDP per capita represent the log of aggregate real GDP of both trading partners and the log of aggregate real GDP per capita, respectively.
Higher income and income per capita imply a higher output volume and accordingly higher trade volumes. Both coe¢ cients should be positive.
regional trade agreement is a binary dummy variable de…ned 1 if both trading partners are members of the same regional trade agreement. This coe¢ cient should be ever colony is de…ned 1 if one of the two trading partners has been the colony of the other.
common country is de…ned 1 if both trading partners have ever been part of a common nation.
landlocked represents a discrete dummy variable de…ned 0, 1 or 2 according to the number of the trading partners that have no access to waterways.
island de…nes the analogous situation in the case of an island.
log area represents the log of aggregate area of both trading countries.
